you can use the below link for all the details:

Very rightly pointed out. The explanation didn’t make sense numerically; I mean, citing the Tamil Nadu floods as the reason for the increase in provisions. This issue was also raised by one of the participants in the Q1 conference call. I didn’t feel that a satisfactory answer was given. According to their own figures, the impact of JLG should not have been more than 3 basis points on the credit cost, yet the increase was nearly 15 basis points. It seems like there were issues in other parts of the portfolio as well.

Few important things have happened in the company over last few months, will be good to update:

• Company has acquired a speciality steel company – Arjas Steel an en EV of about 3000 Cr. I feel this is a very interesting move as the company was earlier going for DI expansion…which would have taken over 3-4 years and its not a great product to get into. While this company has a very large infrastructure and was earlier run by PE fund and hence well suited for Sandur. Sandur already had 1000 Cr cash surplus so this acquisition should help them go to next level.

• All the long pending approvals came through over the last 6 months and if one observes the Q4 presentation, it seems very strong scale up has happened and going forward one should start seeing the benefit of the big expansion in iron ore and manganese ore.

• Co has also expanded a lot in other segments like – Ferro manganese alloys. As of now the cycle is down but in coming times things can change and one may see the benefit.

Overall, there would be a significant change in scale of operations of the company over next 1-2 years because of the multiple things above.

I respectfully disagree with you. Using past performance from a specific point in history to prove or disprove a hypothesis can be misleading, especially if the outcomes change when you shift the time frame by six to twelve months. For instance, starting the return calculation from January 2018 may show different results. If you calculate returns until mid-2023, when the stock was at Rs 100, you might see an even stronger case. However, I don’t think this approach proves anything. There are numerous reasons why the results turned out as they did, and I don’t want to delve into why the Bank Nifty and IDFC First Bank returns were as they were.

It’s worth noting that Rana Kapoor raised capital from the same analyst group at three times the book value, and DHFL and India Bulls raised capital at more than twice the book value. In my view, these facts don’t prove anything either. The same analyst group once praised Chanda Kochhar.

What I’m advocating for is a first-principles approach: estimating future cash flows and applying a margin of safety to arrive at a value. In this case, the management has provided a performance update for the next three years, so we don’t need to speculate further. This is the only way I know to value a business at a given moment.

P.S. I want to point out an instance where Vaidyanathan’s statements didn’t align with reality. If you recall, in FY23, he mentioned in several conference calls that the incremental new business was generating a 16-18% ROE, which explained why operating profit was rising faster than loan growth. He reiterated this point multiple times. If the business grows at 25%, most of the book will be new by FY27. If, by the end of FY27, the company cannot achieve the projected 16-18% ROE, I will definitely start to question other statements he has made.