Overall quantity bought is 3,50,000 shares (worth approx. Rs. 6 Crores) which seems (for me as an individual) to be a peanuts considering the worth of Mr. Nandakumar.

Consider it from a point, a promoter earning handsome salary from listed company, earning approx. 75 Crores in dividend per year but reinvest just a fraction in his own company (where his family own 35%).

Reason → Either he don’t think, company is under-valued; or he is finding better opportunities to reinvest his earnings; or he is leveraged where most of the earnings are used to service personal debt.

Last time Mr. Nandakumar bought from Market in September 2022.

Note: I reinvest entire dividend back in Manappuram.

Munger at it’s best … no doubt projections are always at risk of going wrong.

I was going through the concall of Muthoot … where management guided 15% growth but delivered 20%, whereas Manappuram guided 20% and delivered approx. 19%.

No wonder, Muthoot command double the premium vs Manappuram.

will not move the needle for the company in terms of revenue or profit. Its a sub 2000 crore order book overall, I think.

Impact on HAL will be interms of whether stated defence orders come through and its engine JV and orders get completed. Only thing that is to be monitored.

Discl: No change in Holdings.

Wipro gets $500-mn contract from a leading US communication service provider (msn.com)

After a long time a breakthrough order. Is anyone actively tracking this.

I know the serious issues here but looks relatively cheap. Is that a mirage.

No growth for last few years and degrowth in FY24.

New CEO is from the company so may not make any major moves. Would love opinion on whether it is a probable turnaround story or a deep pit from which recovery is impossible.

While reading an article by The Morning Context on Indian Banking and an article by The Economic Times which highlighted the pains in banking industry and those pains being reflected in the gross NPAs and specially in Write Offs, I decided to look at BASEL Pillar 3 disclosures of IDFC First Bank to understand their write off situation since the start of the bank.
The disclosures used to come up with this data can be seen here: Regulatory Disclosures | IDFC FIRST Bank

Summary of observations
Since the formation of IDFC First Bank (the merger took place in Dec 2018 – these numbers includes disclosures made during fiscal year ended Mar 2019):

• IDFC First Bank declared assets worth 27,997 Crores as NPAs
• Against these, they provided (Gross provisions) for 21,240 crores.
• Of these provisions, 14823 Crores have been written off and 5054 Crores have been upgraded/recovered back. So about 53% of NPAs have been written off and 18% has been recovered/upgraded.
• Excluding write-offs (Assuming no write-offs were made – as was called out in above themorningcontext.com article that the real pain is hidden in write-offs), the closing Gross NPA would have been ₹18,541 crore instead of ₹3,718 Crore (as it is at the end of Mar 31 2024) – roughly 5x or (5×1.88% GNPA = 9.4%)
• For the last financial year (FY24) IDFC First Bank declared NPAs: 5251 Crores (Gross NPA), out of these IDFC First Bank provided for 4437 Crores (NPA Provision). The bank wrote off 2982 Crore (~57% of NPA) and recovered 1477 Crores (~28% of NPA)
• That said, write-offs have been fully taken into P&L as per accounting rules and also as required by the regulator, but this goes on to indicate the pain in banking industry.

Doubts:

• Any one who has been looking into banking disclosures for a while, can you please highlight if I am looking and interpreting the numbers correctly?
• Gross NPA (assuming nothing was written off) at 9.4% – does this indicate a grim situation at Indian Banking industry?

Link to Google Sheet: